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 1 Introduction
“Inﬂation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.” Thus spoke Milton Friedman
(1968, p.39).
Once controversial, Friedman’s words now form part of conventional wisdom for academic
economists and central bankers alike, provided they are appropriately qualiﬁed as follows:
transitory movements in the measured rate of inﬂation can be driven by shocks of various
kinds, but large and persistent movements in inﬂation cannot occur without the help of
monetary policy. Indeed, Friedman himself draws this distinction when deﬁning (p.21) the
“inﬂation” in his statement as a “steady and sustained rise in prices.”
An interest rate rule for monetary policy of the type proposed by Taylor (1993) serves to
highlight exactly the same principles. Under the simplest such rule, the central bank adjusts
the short-term nominal interest rate r around its average or steady-state level r∗ in response
to deviations of output y and inﬂation π from their target or steady-state levels y∗ and π∗
according to
r = r
∗ + ωy(y − y
∗)+ωπ(π − π
∗),
where ωy and ωπ are both positive coeﬃcients. When it adopts such a rule, the central bank
accepts responsibility for choosing the inﬂation target π∗ and for choosing a policy response
coeﬃcient ωπ that is large enough to stabilize the actual inﬂation rate π around its target
π∗. In the short run, movements in measured inﬂation π m a yo c c u rf o rm a n yr e a s o n s ,b u t
in the long run, inﬂation remains tied down by monetary policy.
Nothing dictates that the central bank’s inﬂation target must remain constant over time,
however. In fact, Figure 1 shows that even in the relatively stable postwar United States
economy, inﬂation exhibits large and persistent swings, trending upward throughout the
1960s and 1970s before reversing course and falling during the 1980s and 1990s. Friedman’s
“always and everywhere” dictum strongly sugges t st h a tm o v e m e n t so ft h es i z ea n dpe r s i s t e n c e
seen in Figure 1 could not have taken place without ongoing shifts in the Federal Reserve’s
1inﬂation target. But the Federal Reserve has never explicitly revealed the setting for its
inﬂation target. Hence, a statistical or econometric model must be used to glean information
about the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target from data on observable variables–that is, to
disentangle those movements seen in Figure 1 that reﬂect shifts in the inﬂation target from
those that are attributable to other types of shocks.
This paper develops such a model, drawing on contemporary macroeconomic theory
to provide the identifying restrictions needed to shed light on the patterns, causes, and
consequences of changes in the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target. The macroeconomic theory
comes from a standard New Keynesian framework like those presented by Clarida, Gali, and
Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003) and used throughout the much of the recent literature on
monetary policy and the monetary business cycle. This model oﬀers up a tight description,
not just of Federal Reserve policy, but also of the optimizing behavior of the households and
ﬁrms that populate the American economy. Hence, estimates of the structural parameters
of this simultaneous-equation model not only provide a detailed interpretation of historical
movements in output, inﬂation, and interest rates as seen in the U.S. data, but also allow
for an equally detailed consideration of counterfactual scenarios such as: what would the
behavior of these variables have looked like if, instead, the Federal Reserve had maintained
ac o n s t a n ti n ﬂation target throughout the postwar period?
Blinder (1982), Hetzel (1998), and Mayer (1998) all attribute the upward secular trend in
inﬂation shown in Figure 1 for the period before 1980 to a systematic tendency for Federal
Reserve policy to translate the short-run price pressures set oﬀ by adverse supply shocks into
more persistent changes in the inﬂation rate itself–part of an eﬀort by policymakers to avoid
at least some of the contractionary impact those shocks would otherwise have had on the real
economy. Symmetrically, Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000) and Orphanides and Wilcox (2002)
suggest that at times during the post-1980 period, the Federal Reserve took advantage of
favorable supply-side disturbances to “opportunistically” work the inﬂation rate back down.
To capture these ideas, the model developed here includes a generalized Taylor rule that
2allows the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target to respond systematically to shocks hitting the
economy from the supply side. The estimation results provide some support for a uniﬁed
version of these stories that applies to the entire postwar period, although the same results
also indicate that considerable uncertainty remains as to exactly why the Federal Reserve
allowed inﬂa t i o nt om o v ea sm u c ha si td i d .
Before going on to provide a more detailed description of the model and results, mention
should be made of three related sets of contributions to the recent literature. First, Kozicki
and Tinsley (2001), Dewachter and Lyrio (2003), Rudebusch and Wu (2004), and Gurkaynak,
Sack, and Swanson (2005) argue that the behavior of both short- and long-term interest rates
in the U.S. data becomes easier to reconcile with the expectations hypothesis of the term
structure if one allows for shifts in the long-run inﬂation rate. Thus, these previous studies
help motivate the analysis performed here, which focuses solely on macroeconomic variables
in an eﬀort to estimate more sharply exactly when those shifts took place and why.
Second, Favero and Rovelli (2003), Surico (2003), and Dennis (2004) estimate small-
scale macroeconomic models and detect evidence of a one-time shift in the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target occurring coincidentally with the appointment of Paul Volcker as Federal
Reserve Chairman in 1979, but these previous studies do not allow for more frequent changes
in the inﬂation target like those considered here. Erceg and Levin (2003), Salemi (2003),
Smets and Wouters (2003), Roberts (2004), Cogley and Sbordone (2005), and Gavin, Keen,
and Pakko (2005), on the other hand, develop macroeconomic models that do allow for
continual movement in the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target. However, each of these previous
studies focuses on a diﬀerent set of issues: Erceg and Levin (2003), on private agents’ inability
to disentangle transitory from persistent movements in the inﬂation target and the role that
this incomplete information plays in accounting for the inﬂationary dynamics observed during
the Volcker disinﬂation in the U.S.; Salemi (2003), on the relative weights placed by the
Federal Reserve on its stabilization objectives for output, inﬂation, and interest rates over the
postwar period; Smets and Wouters (2003), on the ability of their larger-scale New Keynesian
3model to track the postwar U.S. data on a larger number of variables both in and out of
sample; Roberts (2004), on the ability of his model to capture the changing relationships
between U.S. unemployment and inﬂation since 1980; Cogley and Sbordone (2005), on the
stability of the estimated parameters of a Phillips curve relationship in the face of changes
elsewhere in the economy; and Gavin, Keen, and Pakko (2005), on the ability of their model
to account for the persistence of inﬂation and the relative volatilities of money growth and
inﬂation in the post-1980 U.S. data. Thus, none of these previous studies focuses as this
paper does on obtaining estimates of the Federal Reserve’s continually-changing inﬂation
target over the postwar period; and none of these previous studies attempts as this paper
does to model speciﬁcally those target changes as deliberate policy responses to other shocks
that have hit the economy, in order to tie together the stories told earlier by Blinder (1982),
Hetzel (1998), and Mayer (1998) on the one hand and Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000) and
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002) on the other.
Third and ﬁnally, in work that relates most closely to the present study, Kozicki and
Tinsley (2003) develop an empirical model–a generalized vector autoregression–that allows
for changes in the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target that are imperfectly perceived by private
agents and that reﬂect, in part, the response of the central bank to supply shocks that have
hit the U.S. economy over the postwar period. But whereas Kozicki and Tinsley focus
on the diﬀering responses of the economy to shocks of various kinds as implied by their
generalized model versus a more conventional vector autoregression that assumes a constant
inﬂation target and full information possessed by private agents, the focus here, again, lies
in characterizing more sharply the nature and sources of variation in the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target itself and linking the econometric results to the earlier accounts of Blinder
(1982), Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1998), Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000) and Orphanides and
Wilcox (2002). The analysis presented here also extends and complements Kozicki and
Tinsley’s earlier work by imposing more structure on the data, fully exploiting the behavioral
relationships implied by the New Keynesian model.
42 The Model
2.1 Overview and Rationale
The model developed here shares its basic features with many recent New Keynesian formu-
lations, including the benchmark models of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003), but resembles most closely the speciﬁcation used in Ireland (2004a). As noted above,
one extension to previous models that appears for the ﬁr s tt i m eh e r ei sag e n e r a l i z e dT a y l o r
(1993) rule for monetary policy that allows the central bank’s inﬂation target to adjust in
response to other shocks that hit the economy. Indeed, the use of this tightly parameterized
structural model, as opposed to a more loosely constrained vector autoregression or unob-
served components model, allows for the simultaneous identiﬁcation not just of movements
in the inﬂation target but also of the exogenous supply-side disturbances that, according to
Blinder (1982), Hetzel (1998), and Mayer (1998), prompted the Federal Reserve to accom-
modate higher and higher rates of inﬂation throughout the 1960s and 1970s. And, again, as
noted above, the use of this tightly parameterized structural model responds to the Lucas
(1976) critique, allowing for a detailed consideration of the counterfactual scenario in which,
instead, the Federal Reserve held the line on inﬂation in the face of these shocks.
The model economy consists of a representative household, a representative ﬁnished-
goods-producing ﬁrm, a continuum of intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms indexed by i ∈
[0,1], and a central bank. During each period t =0 ,1,2,..., each intermediate-goods-
producing ﬁrm manufactures a distinct, perishable intermediate good. Hence, intermediate
goods may also be indexed by i ∈ [0,1],w h e r eﬁrm i produces good i. The model retains
enough symmetry, however, to allow the analysis to focus on the activities of a representative
intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm, which produces the generic intermediate good i.T h u s ,
a description of the model boils down to a description of the optimizing behavior of three
representative private agents–the household, the ﬁnished-goods-producing ﬁrm, and the
intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm–together with a description of the generalized Taylor
5rule adopted by the central bank.
2.2 The Representative Household
The representative household enters each period t =0 ,1,2,... with money Mt−1 and bonds
Bt−1. At the beginning of period t, the household receives a lump-sum nominal transfer Tt
from the central bank. Next, the household’s bonds mature, throwing oﬀ Bt−1 additional
units of money. The household uses some of this money to purchase Bt new bonds at the
price of 1/Rt units of money per bond, where Rt denotes the gross nominal interest rate
between t and t +1 .
During period t, the household supplies a total of ht units of labor to the various
intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms and gets paid at the nominal wage rate Wt.A l s od u r i n g
period t, the household consumes Ct units of the ﬁnished good, purchased at the nominal
price Pt from the representative ﬁnished-goods-producing ﬁrm.
At the end of period t, the household receives nominal proﬁts Dt in the form of dividends
paid by the intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms. The household then carries Mt units of
money into period t +1 ; its budget constraint requires that
Mt−1 + Tt + Bt−1 + Wtht + Dt ≥ PtCt + Mt + Bt/Rt (1)
for all t =0 ,1,2,....
The household’s preferences are described by the expected utility function
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tat[ln(Ct − γCt−1)+l n ( Mt/Pt) − ht],
where the discount factor β and the habit formation parameter γ both lie between zero and
one: 1 >β>0 and 1 >γ≥ 0. The preference shock at follows the stationary autoregressive
process
ln(at)=ρa ln(at−1)+σaεat (2)
6for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w i t h1 >ρ a ≥ 0 and σa ≥ 0, where the serially uncorrelated innovation
εat has the standard normal distribution. Utility is additively separable in consumption,
real money balances, and hours worked; as shown by Driscoll (2000) and Ireland (2004b),
this additive separability is needed to derive a conventional speciﬁcation for the model’s IS
relationship that, in particular, excludes terms involving money and employment. Given this
additive separability, the logarithmic speciﬁcation for utility from consumption is needed, as
shown by King, Plosser, and Rebelo (1988), for the model to remain consistent with balanced
growth. Finally, habit formation is introduced into preferences following Fuhrer (2000), who
shows that this feature–and the partially backward-looking consumption it implies–helps
New Keynesian models like this one replicate the observed eﬀects on real spending of shocks
of various kinds.
Thus, the household chooses Ct, ht, Bt,a n dMt for all t =0 ,1,2,... to maximize its
expected utility subject to the budget constraint (1) for all t =0 ,1,2,....T h e ﬁrst-order
conditions for this problem can be written as
Λt =
at
Ct − γCt−1
− βγEt
µ
at+1
Ct+1 − γCt
¶
, (3)
at = Λt(Wt/Pt), (4)
Λt = βRtEt(Λt+1/Πt+1), (5)
Mt/Pt =( at/Λt)[Rt/(Rt − 1)], (6)
and (1) with equality for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w h e r eΛt denotes the nonnegative Lagrange
multiplier on the budget constraint expressed in real terms for period t,a n dΠt = Pt/Pt−1
denotes the gross inﬂation rate between t − 1 and t. Equation (3) identiﬁes the multiplier
Λt with the marginal utility of consumption during period t, adjusted to account for the
habit-persistence eﬀects that carry over into t +1 . Since utility is linear in hours worked,
(4) equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to the real
7wage. The Euler equation (5) relates the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution to the
real interest rate, while (6) takes the form of a money demand relationship, implying that
real balances rise as consumption rises and the nominal interest rate falls.
2.3 The Representative Finished-Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t =0 ,1,2,..., the representative ﬁnished-goods-producing ﬁrm uses Yt(i)
u n i t so fe a c hi n t e r m e d i a t eg o o di ∈ [0,1], purchased at the nominal price Pt(i),t om a n u -
facture Yt units of the ﬁnished good according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology
described by ∙Z 1
0
Yt(i)
(θt−1)/θtdi
¸θt/(θt−1)
≥ Yt,
where θt follows the stationary autoregressive process
ln(θt)=( 1− ρθ)ln(θ)+ρθ ln(θt−1)+σθεθt (7)
for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w i t h1 >ρ θ ≥ 0 and σθ ≥ 0, and where the serially uncorrelated
innovation εθt has the standard normal distribution. The ﬁrm acts to maximize its proﬁts;
the ﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
Yt(i)=[ Pt(i)/Pt]
−θtYt
for all i ∈ [0,1] and t =0 ,1,2,....
These optimality conditions reveal that −θt measures the time-varying elasticity of de-
mand for each intermediate good i ∈ [0,1]. Hence, as in Smets and Wouters (2003), Steinsson
(2003), and Ireland (2004a), random shocks to θt translate into shocks to the intermediate-
goods-producing ﬁrms’ desired markups of price over marginal cost; in equilibrium, they act
like cost-push shocks of the kind introduced into the New Keynesian model by Clarida, Gali,
and Gertler (1999). Competition drives the ﬁnished-goods-producing ﬁrm’s proﬁts to zero
8in equilibrium, determining Pt as
Pt =
∙Z 1
0
Pt(i)
1−θtdi
¸1/(1−θt)
for all t =0 ,1,2,....
2.4 The Representative Intermediate-Goods-Producing Firm
During each period t =0 ,1,2,..., the representative intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm hires
ht(i) units of labor from the representative household to manufacture Yt(i) units of interme-
diate good i according to the constant-returns-to-scale technology described by
Ztht(i) ≥ Yt(i). (8)
The aggregate technology shock follows a random walk with drift:
ln(Zt)=l n ( z)+l n ( Zt−1)+σzεzt (9)
for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w i t hz>1 and σz ≥ 0, where the serially uncorrelated innovation
εzt has the standard normal distribution. This random walk assumption for the technology
shock serves to distinguish its eﬀects from those of the cost-push shock: as supply-side
disturbances, both shocks tend to move output and inﬂa t i o ni no p p o s i t ed i r e c t i o n si nt h e
short run, but only the technology shock has permanent eﬀects on the level of output.
Since the intermediate goods substitute imperfectly for one another in producing the
ﬁnished good, the representative intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm sells its output in a mo-
nopolistically competitive market: during period t,t h eﬁrm sets the nominal price Pt(i) for its
output, subject to the requirement that it satisfy the representative ﬁnished-goods-producing
ﬁrm’s demand at that chosen price. And, as in Rotemberg (1982), the intermediate-goods-
producing ﬁrm faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its price between periods, measured in
9terms of the ﬁnished good and given by
φ
2
∙
Pt(i)
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
¸2
Yt,
where φ ≥ 0 governs the magnitude of the adjustment cost, Π∗
t denotes the central bank’s
inﬂation target for period t, and the parameter α lies between zero and one: 1 ≥ α ≥ 0.
According to this speciﬁcation, the extent to which price setting is forward or backward
looking depends on whether α is closer to zero or one. At one extreme, when α =0 ,p r i c e
setting is purely forward looking, in the sense that ﬁrms ﬁnd it costless to adjust their prices
in line with the central bank’s inﬂation target. At the other extreme, when α =1 ,p r i c e
setting is purely backward looking, in the sense that ﬁrms ﬁnd it costless to adjust their
prices in line with the previous period’s inﬂation rate.
In any case, the cost of price adjustment makes the intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm’s
problem dynamic: it chooses Pt(i) for all t =0 ,1,2,... to maximize its real market value,
given by
E0
∞ X
t=0
β
tΛt[Dt(i)/Pt],
where β
tΛt measures the marginal utility value to the representative household of an addi-
tional unit of real proﬁts received in the form of dividends during period t and where
Dt(i)
Pt
=
∙
Pt(i)
Pt
¸1−θt
Yt −
∙
Pt(i)
Pt
¸−θt µ
Wt
Pt
¶µ
Yt
Zt
¶
−
φ
2
∙
Pt(i)
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
¸2
Yt (10)
measures the ﬁrm’s real proﬁts during period t in light of the requirement that it sell its
10output on demand at price Pt(i).T h eﬁrst-order conditions for this problem are
0=( 1 − θt)
∙
Pt(i)
Pt
¸−θt
+ θt
∙
Pt(i)
Pt
¸−θt−1 µ
Wt
Pt
¶µ
1
Zt
¶
(11)
−φ
∙
Pt(i)
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−αPt−1(i)
− 1
¸∙
Pt
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−αPt−1(i)
¸
+βφEt
½µ
Λt+1
Λt
¶∙
Pt+1(i)
Πα
t (Π∗
t+1)1−αPt(i)
− 1
¸∙
Pt+1(i)
Πα
t (Π∗
t+1)1−αPt(i)
¸∙
Pt
Pt(i)
¸µ
Yt+1
Yt
¶¾
and (8) with equality for all t =0 ,1,2,.... In the absence of price adjustment costs, when
φ =0 , (11) simply implies that the ﬁrm sets its price Pt(i) as a markup θt/(θt − 1) over
marginal cost Wt/Zt. Hence, as suggested above, θt/(θt −1) can be interpreted as the ﬁrm’s
desired markup, and random ﬂuctuations in θt a c ta ss h o c k st ot h eﬁrm’s desired markup.
Costly price adjustment (φ>0)t h e ni m p l i e st h a ta c t u a lm a r k ups deviate from, but tend to
gravitate towards, their desired level as ﬁr m sr e s p o n do p t i m a l l yt ot h es h o c k st h a th i tt h e
economy.
2.5 The Central Bank
The central bank conducts monetary policy according to the generalized Taylor (1993) rule
ln(Rt) − ln(Rt−1)=ρπ ln(Πt/Π
∗
t)+ρgy ln(g
y
t/g
y)+l n ( vt) (12)
for all t =0 ,1,2,..., where the response coeﬃcients ρπ > 0 and ρgy ≥ 0 are chosen by the
central bank. Here, as in Fuhrer and Moore (1995), the central bank increases the short-
term nominal interest rate Rt whenever the inﬂation rate Πt rises above its target Π∗
t;a
strictly positive value for ρπ helps provide for the existence of a unique rational expectations
equilibrium under an interest rate rule of this type. Since the level of output Yt inherits a
unit root from the random walk process (9) for the technology shock Zt, (12) dictates that
11the central bank respond instead to the growth rate of output
g
y
t = Yt/Yt−1 (13)
as a stationary measure of real economic activity, increasing the short-term nominal interest
rate whenever output growth rises about its steady-state level gy = z. The transitory
monetary policy shock vt in (12) follows the stationary autoregressive process
ln(vt)=ρv ln(vt−1)+σvεvt (14)
for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w i t h1 >ρ v ≥ 0 and σv ≥ 0, where the serially uncorrelated innovation
εvt has the standard normal distribution.
As noted above, a novel feature of the generalized Taylor rule (12) incorporated into this
model is the time-varying inﬂation target Π∗
t, which evolves according to
ln(Π
∗
t)=l n ( Π
∗
t−1) − δθεθt − δzεzt + σπεπt (15)
for all t =0 ,1,2,..., where the response coeﬃcients δθ ≥ 0 and δz ≥ 0 are again chosen
by the central bank, where σπ ≥ 0, and where the serially uncorrelated innovation επt
has the standard normal distribution. This addition to the Taylor rule allows the inﬂation
target to vary exogenously when σπ is strictly positive and also allows the central bank to
systematically adjust its inﬂation target in response to either or both of the two supply
shocks: the cost-push shock θt and the technology shock Zt. Since adverse supply shocks
(negative realizations of εθt and εzt) work to increase goods’ prices, and favorable supply
shocks (positive realizations of εθt and εzt) work to decrease goods’ prices, strictly positive
values for δθ and δz help the model bring together and formalize the stories told by Blinder
(1982), Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1998), Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000), and Orphanides and
Wilcox (2002), according to which the Federal Reserve acted systematically over the postwar
12period to translate the short-run price pressures set oﬀ by these shocks into more persistent
movements in the inﬂation rate itself.
Finally, the random walk speciﬁcation for the inﬂation target that is built into (15)
represents an identifying assumption that, in very much the same spirit as the random walk
assumption (9) for technology, helps to distinguish the eﬀects of changes in the inﬂation
target from those generated by the model’s four other shocks. This identifying assumption,
motivated by Friedman’s (1968) “always and everywhere” dictum, can be stated more simply
as: permanent changes in measured inﬂation Πt cannot occur without corresponding changes
in the central bank’s inﬂation target Π∗
t.
Preliminary econometric analysis of this New Keynesian model allowed the central bank,
through an expanded version of the Taylor rule (12), to adjust the short-term nominal interest
rate not only in response to movements in inﬂation and output growth, but also in response
to movements in a welfare-theoretic measure of the output gap, deﬁned as the deviation of
actual equilibrium output from its eﬃcient, or Pareto optimal, level. As well, preliminary
analysis allowed the central bank, through an expanded version of (15), to adjust its inﬂation
target not only in response to the cost-push and technology shocks, but also in response to the
preference shock. Inevitably, however, the estimation routine pushed the associated response
coeﬃcients towards zero, and so, for simplicity, these additional variables were dropped from
the ﬁnal speciﬁcation used here.
2.6 Symmetric Equilibrium
In a symmetric equilibrium, all intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrms make identical decisions,
so that Yt(i)=Yt, ht(i)=ht, Dt(i)=Dt,a n dPt(i)=Pt for all i ∈ [0,1] and t =0 ,1,2,....
In addition, the market-clearing conditions for money and bonds, Mt = Mt−1 + Tt and
Bt = Bt−1 =0must hold for all t =0 ,1,2,.... After imposing these equilibrium conditions,
and using (4), (6), (8), and (10) to solve for Wt, Mt, ht,a n dDt, the household’s budget
13constraint (1) can be rewritten as the aggregate resource constraint
Yt = Ct +
φ
2
∙
Πt
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−α − 1
¸2
Yt, (16)
and the intermediate-goods-producing ﬁrm’s optimal price adjustment rule (11) simpliﬁes to
θt − 1=θt
µ
at
ΛtZt
¶
− φ
∙
Πt
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−α − 1
¸∙
Πt
Πα
t−1(Π∗
t)1−α
¸
(17)
+βφEt
½µ
Λt+1
Λt
¶∙
Πt+1
Πα
t (Π∗
t+1)1−α − 1
¸∙
Πt+1
Πα
t (Π∗
t+1)1−α
¸µ
Yt+1
Yt
¶¾
for all t =0 ,1,2,.... These last two equations, together with (2), (3), (5), (7), (9), and
(12)-(15), form a system that completely determines the equilibrium behavior of the eleven
variables Yt, Ct, Πt, Rt, g
y
t, Λt, at, θt, Zt, vt,a n dΠ∗
t.
2.7 The Linearized System
In equilibrium, the real variables Yt, Ct,a n dΛt all inherit unit roots from the process (9)
for technology Zt; however, the transformed variables yt = Yt/Zt, ct = Ct/Zt, λt = ZtΛt,
and zt = Zt/Zt−1 all remain stationary, as does the output growth rate g
y
t. Similarly, the
nominal variables Πt and Rt i n h e r i tu n i tr o o t sf r o mt h ep r o c e s s( 1 5 )f o rt h ei n ﬂation target
Π∗
t; however, the transformed variables πt = Πt/Π∗
t, rt = Rt/Π∗
t,a n dπ∗
t = Π∗
t/Π∗
t−1 remain
stationary, as do the growth rate of inﬂation
g
π
t = Πt/Πt−1 (18)
and the ratio of the nominal interest rate to the inﬂation rate
r
rπ
t = Rt/Πt. (19)
14When rewritten in terms of these stationary variables, (2), (3), (5), (7), (9), and (12)-(19)
imply that, in the absence of shocks, the economy converges to a steady state growth path,
along which yt = y =[ ( θ − 1)/θ][(z − βγ)/(z − γ)], ct = c =[ ( θ − 1)/θ][(z − βγ)/(z − γ)],
πt =1 , rt = r = z/β, g
y
t = gy = z, gπ
t =1 , rrπ
t = rrπ = z/β, λt = λ = θ/(θ − 1), at =1 ,
θt = θ, zt = z, vt =1 ,a n dπ∗
t =1for all t =0 ,1,2,....
The stationary system can therefore be log-linearized around its steady state to describe
how the economy responds to shocks. Let ˆ yt =l n ( yt/y), ˆ ct =l n ( ct/c), ˆ πt =l n ( πt), ˆ rt =
ln(rt/r), ˆ g
y
t =l n ( g
y
t/gy), ˆ gπ
t =l n ( gπ
t ), ˆ rrπ
t =l n ( rrπ
t /rrπ), ˆ λt =l n ( λt/λ), ˆ at =l n ( at), ˆ θt =
ln(θt/θ), ˆ zt =l n ( zt/z), ˆ vt =l n ( vt),a n dˆ π
∗
t =l n ( π∗
t) measure the percentage deviation of
each stationary variable from its steady-state level. A ﬁr s t - o r d e rT a y l o ra p p r o x i m a t i o nt o
the aggregate resource constraint (16) implies that ˆ ct =ˆ yt: price adjustment costs are of
second-order importance around the steady state growth path. First-order approximations
to the remaining twelve equations then imply
(z − γ)(z − βγ)ˆ λt = γzˆ yt−1 − (z
2 + βγ
2)ˆ yt + βγzEtˆ yt+1 +( z − γ)(z − βγρa)ˆ at − γzˆ zt, (20)
ˆ λt = Etˆ λt+1 +ˆ rt − Etˆ πt+1, (21)
(1 + βα)ˆ πt = αˆ πt−1 + βEtˆ πt+1 + ψ(ˆ at − ˆ λt) − ˆ et − αˆ π
∗
t, (22)
ˆ rt − ˆ rt−1 = ρπˆ πt + ρgyˆ g
y
t − ˆ π
∗
t +ˆ vt, (23)
ˆ π
∗
t = σπεπt − δeεet − δzεzt, (24)
ˆ g
y
t =ˆ yt − ˆ yt−1 +ˆ zt, (25)
ˆ g
π
t =ˆ πt − ˆ πt−1 +ˆ π
∗
t, (26)
ˆ r
rπ
t =ˆ rt − ˆ πt, (27)
ˆ at = ρaˆ at−1 + σaεat, (28)
15ˆ et = ρeˆ et−1 + σeεet, (29)
ˆ zt = σzεzt, (30)
and
ˆ vt = ρvˆ vt−1 + σvεvt (31)
for all t =0 ,1,2,...,w h e r e ,i n( 2 2 ) ,( 2 4 ) ,a n d( 2 9 ) ,t h ec o s t - p u s hs h o c kˆ θt has been renor-
malized as ˆ et =( 1 /φ)ˆ θt, and the new parameters ψ, δe, ρe,a n dσe have been deﬁned as
ψ =( θ−1)/φ, δe = δθ, ρe = ρθ,a n dσe = σθ/φ,s ot h a t ,l i k eεθt, εet has the standard normal
distribution.
Since (25)-(27) simply restate the deﬁnitions of the output growth rate ˆ g
y
t,t h ei n ﬂation
growth rate ˆ gπ
t , and the ratio of the nominal interest rate to the inﬂation rate ˆ rrπ
t and since
(28)-(31) simply describe the processes for the exogenous preference, cost-push, technology,
and monetary policy shocks, the model’s economic content is concentrated in (20)-(24). In
particular, (21) takes the form of a New Keynesian IS curve linking the marginal utility of
consumption during period t to its own expected future value and to the value of the ex
ante real interest rate, while (20) measures the marginal utility of consumption and includes
both forward- and backward-looking terms based on the habit formation speciﬁcation for
preferences. Equation (22) takes the form of a hybrid forward- and backward-looking New
Keynesian Phillips curve, with the parameter α from the price adjustment cost formulation
indexing the degree of backward-looking behavior, the parameter ψ multiplying the real
marginal cost term ˆ at − ˆ λt, and the cost-push shock ˆ et entering additively. Finally, (23) and
(24) describe the conduct of monetary policy, including the possibly endogenous evolution
of the central bank’s inﬂation target as well as the Taylor-type adjustment of the nominal
interest rate taken to stabilize actual inﬂa t i o na r o u n di t st a r g e t .
163 Empirical Strategy and Results
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) and Klein (2000) describe methods for solving systems of lin-
earized expectational diﬀerence equations such as (20)-(31). These methods provide solu-
tions that quite conveniently take the same form as a state-space econometric model: in this
case, the solution links the behavior of the stationary model’s three observable variables–the
growth rate of output ˆ g
y
t, the growth rate of inﬂation ˆ gπ
t , and the ratio of the nominal interest
rate to the inﬂation rate ˆ rrπ
t –to the nine unobservable variables. Hence, the Kalman ﬁltering
algorithms outlined by Hamilton (1994, Ch.13) can be applied to obtain maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the model’s structural parameters and to optimally exploit information
contained in the observable data to draw inferences about the behavior of the unobservables
including, most importantly, the unobservable inﬂation target ˆ π
∗
t.
Here, this econometric exercise uses quarterly U.S. data running from 1959:1 through
2004:2. In these data, readings on seasonally-adjusted real gross domestic product in chained
2000 dollars, expressed in per-capita terms by dividing by the civilian noninstitutional pop-
ulation, age 16 and over, provide the measure of output Yt. Readings on the seasonally-
adjusted GDP implicit price deﬂator provide the measure of the nominal price level Pt,a n d
readings on the three-month U.S. Treasury bill rate provide the measure of the short-term
nominal interest rate Rt. Prior to their use in the estimation exercise, these raw series get
passed through the same stationarity-inducing transformations required to solve the theo-
retical model. Hence, the empirical model assumes that all three series contain unit roots
but that the inﬂation and interest rates are cointegrated so that, again, the growth rate of
output, the growth rate of inﬂation, and the ratio of the nominal interest rate to the inﬂation
rate are the most relevant stationary variables.
Under the additional assumption that the innovations εat, εet, εzt, εvt,a n dεπt are mu-
tually as well as serially uncorrelated, the model has 17 parameters: z, β, ψ, γ, α, ρπ, ρgy,
ρa, ρe, ρv, σa, σe, σz, σv, σπ, δe,a n dδz.V a l u e sz =1 .0047 and β =0 .9995 for the ﬁrst two
parameters on this list are ﬁxed prior to estimation in order to insure that the steady-state
17rate of output growth gy = z and the steady-state ratio of the nominal interest rate to the
inﬂation rate rrπ = z/β as implied by the theoretical model match the average values of the
same two variables as measured in the data. The model implies that along the steady-state
growth path, the rate of growth in inﬂation is zero and, indeed, in the U.S. data, the sample
average of the growth rate of inﬂation is quite small: Figure 1 reveals that, in levels, the
inﬂation rate ends the 45-year sample period at approximately the same point at which it
begins, so that the average quarterly rate of change in inﬂation over four-and-a-half decades
is only 0.000016, that is, 0.0016 of one percent or 0.16 basis points. Hence, all variables are
accurately de-meaned prior to estimation, in a manner consistent with the implications of
the theoretical model.
Preliminary attempts to estimate the model’s remaining 15 parameters consistently led
to very small values of ψ,t h ec o e ﬃcient on real marginal cost in the Phillips curve (22);
since ψ =( θ − 1)/φ, these small values for ψ correspond to very large values for the price
adjustment cost parameter φ. Hence, in deriving the results described below, the same
setting ψ =0 .10 used in Ireland (2004a,2 0 0 4 b) is also imposed prior to estimation. The
formulas displayed by Gali and Gertler (1999, p.211) provide a convenient way of interpreting
this setting for ψ:i nam o d e li nw h i c hﬁrms set prices in a staggered fashion according to
Calvo’s (1983) formulation instead of facing an explicit cost of price adjustment as they
do here, a value of ψ =0 .10 for the coeﬃcient on the real marginal cost term in a purely
forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve implies that individual goods prices remain
ﬁxed, on average, for 3.7 quarters–or just under one year.
With these three parameter values ﬁxed in advance, Table 1 presents maximum likelihood
estimates of the model’s remaining parameters along with their standard errors, computed
b yt a k i n gt h es q u a r er o o t so ft h ed i a g o n a le l e m e n t so fm i n u so n et i m e st h ei n v e r t e dm a t r i x
of second derivatives of the maximized log-likelihood function. To assist in interpreting
many of the results presented below, the table reports two sets of estimates: one obtained
from an unconstrained “endogenous target” version of the model in which all 14 parameters,
18including the inﬂation target response coeﬃcients δe and δz, are estimated freely and the
other obtained from a constrained “exogenous target” version of the model in which δe and
δz remain ﬁxed at zero while the other 12 parameters are estimated freely.
For both versions of the model, the estimates imply a degree of backward-looking be-
havior in consumption, as measured by a habit-formation parameter γ around 0.25, that is
signiﬁcant both economically and statistically, but no backward-looking behavior in price
setting. For both versions of the model, the estimates reveal that both inﬂation and out-
put growth enter signiﬁcantly into the Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate; the policy
response to inﬂation, however, appears considerably more vigorous than the associated re-
sponse to output growth. And for both versions of the model, the estimates suggest that
the preference shock is highly persistent while the cost-push and monetary policy shocks are
much less so.
The basic workings of the model are most conveniently illustrated by tracing out impulse
response functions generated from the exogenous target variant, since in that case the eﬀects
of the cost-push and technology shocks are not distorted by coincident changes in the inﬂation
target. Hence, Figure 2 displays these impulse responses. The graphs conﬁrm that the
preference shock acts as an exogenous demand-side disturbance, moving output, inﬂation,
and the short-term nominal interest rate in the same direction. The cost-push and technology
shocks, by contrast, act as supply-side disturbances, moving output and inﬂa t i o ni no p p o s i t e
directions. As noted above, the random walk speciﬁcation for technology serves to distinguish
between the eﬀects of these two supply-side shocks: a favorable cost-push shock leads to a
purely transitory increase in output, whereas a favorable technology shock permanently raises
the level of output. In addition, the larger and more persistent increase in output growth
that follows the technology shock implies, under the estimated Taylor rule, that the nominal
interest rate rises after the technology shock but falls after the cost-push shock.
A one-standard-deviation innovation to the transitory monetary policy shock works to
increase the annualized short-term nominal interest rate by about 36 basis points and keeps
19the interest rate above its steady-state level for two years. This exogenous monetary tight-
ening generates a decline in output of about 30 basis points and a fall in inﬂation of about
50 basis points; these movements in output and inﬂation, like that of the interest rate it-
self, persist over a period of about two years. Finally, a one-standard-deviation shock to
the inﬂation target leads to a permanent 40-basis-point increase in both the inﬂation and
nominal interest rates. As inﬂation overshoots in the short run, while the nominal interest
rate adjusts only gradually, the real interest rate falls, generating an 11-basis-point rise in
output that persists for more than two years.
For the endogenous target model, the estimates δe =0 .0010, δz =0 .0002,a n dσπ =
0.0000 attribute all movements in the inﬂation target to the Federal Reserve’s deliberate
response to the two supply shocks: the exogenous shock to the inﬂation target no longer
plays a role in explaining the data. A clear interpretation of these parameter estimates
emerges from Figure 3, which plots impulse responses generated from the unconstrained
model. In particular, the ﬁgure shows that under the estimated policy, the inﬂation tar-
get falls by 41 basis points following a favorable one-standard-deviation cost-push shock
and, symmetrically, rises by the same amount following a similarly-sized adverse cost-push
disturbance. The ﬁgure also reveals that by adjusting the inﬂation target in this manner,
the Federal Reserve’s policy works to completely insulate output from the eﬀects of these
cost-push shocks: a favorable cost-push shock now causes output to fall very slightly, by 4
basis points, before returning to its steady-state level. The smaller estimated value for δz
implies a correspondingly smaller 6.4-basis-point adjustment of the inﬂation target following
a one-standard-deviation technology shock.
Comparing the point estimates of δe to δz with their standard errors suggests that the
policy response to the cost-push shock is more important, not just economically, as shown
in Figure 3, but statistically as well. However, computation of the standard errors shown in
Table 1 involves two steps–ﬁrst, the numerical evaluation of the matrix of second derivatives
of the maximized log-likelihood function and, second, the numerical evaluation of the inverse
20of that matrix–both of which can make those ﬁgures less than fully reliable. Hence, Table
1 also compares the maximized value of the log-likelihood function for both versions of the
model: 2310.68 with the endogenous inﬂation target versus 2309.87 with the exogenous
target. Since the exogenous target model is a constrained version of the endogenous target
model, the likelihood ratio statistic of 1.62, formed by doubling the diﬀerence between these
two values, suggests that, in fact, the null hypothesis that δe =0and δz =0cannot
be rejected with any reasonable degree of conﬁdence. Thus, while the estimates from the
endogenous target model do provide some support for a combined version of the stories
told by Blinder (1982), Hetzel (1998), Mayer (1998), Bomﬁm and Rudebusch (2000), and
Orphanides and Wilcox (2002), according to which the Federal Reserve consistently acted
over the postwar period to translate the purely transitory price pressures brought about by
supply shocks–particularly cost-push shocks–into more persistent movements in inﬂation,
considerable uncertainty remains about the true source of movements in the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target, so one cannot statistically reject the exogenous target model that depicts
those movements as purely random.
Tables 2 and 3 present forecast error variance decompositions performed with the exoge-
nous and endogenous target models. According to both model variants, technology shocks
represent the dominant source of movements in output, although preference and monetary
policy shocks do play a supporting role in driving short-run output ﬂuctuations. Prefer-
ence shocks become more important in accounting for movements in the nominal interest
rate. And both model variants attribute low-frequency movements in inﬂation to changes in
the inﬂation target, although the constrained model interprets these movements as purely
exogenous, whereas the unconstrained model views them instead as reﬂecting the Federal
Reserve’s deliberate policy response to cost-push shocks.
Figures 4 and 5 superimpose estimates of the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target on the
graph of actual U.S. inﬂation shown originally as Figure 1. These estimates reﬂect infor-
mation contained in the full data sample, that is, they are generated using the smoothing
21algorithms described by Hamilton (1994, pp.394-397) and generalized by Kohn and Ansley
(1983) to handle cases like the one that arises here, where the state covariance matrix turns
out to be singular. Consistent with all of the previous results, the two model variants have
very similar implications for the evolving path of the inﬂation target although, again, the
sources of the inferred movements diﬀer: those in Figure 4 are interpreted as purely ex-
ogenous, while those in Figure 5 are taken as reﬂections of the Federal Reserve’s deliberate
response to supply-side disturbances–mainly cost-push shocks. For the exogenous target
model, Figure 4 shows that the estimated inﬂation target rises from 1.18 percent in 1959:1
to twin peaks of 7.98 percent in 1974:4 and 8.02 percent in 1980:4. The estimated target
hits its post-1980 low of 1.70 percent in both 1998:2 and 2002:1 before rising slightly to 2.14
percent by the end of the sample period in 2004:2. Meanwhile, for the endogenous target
model, Figure 5 indicates that the estimated target starts at 1.24 percent in 1959:1, peaks at
8.52 percent in 1974:4 and 8.12 percent in 1980:4, falls to its post-1980 low of 1.80 percent
in both 1998:2 and 2002:1, and stands at 2.48 percent in 2004:2.
Finally, the structural model developed and estimated here responds positively to the
Lucas (1976) critique by cleanly separating out the parameters describing the central bank’s
policy rule–parameters that will change when that rule changes–from those describing
private tastes and technologies–which ought to remain invariant to shifts in the policy rule.
Hence, the estimated model provides a detailed answer to questions such as: how would
the U.S. economy have behaved if, instead of allowing inﬂation to rise and fall, the Federal
Reserve had maintained a constant inﬂation target throughout the postwar period? Along
those lines, Figures 6 and 7 compare the actual paths for output, inﬂation, and the short-
term nominal interest rate as observed in the historical data to those that, according to the
two versions of the model, would have been realized under a constant inﬂation target, that is,
in the counterfactual case where instead of equalling their estimated values, the parameters
δe, δz,a n dσπ all equal zero.
The ﬁgures reveal that the path for output–expressed either in levels or growth rates–
22looks much the same under the counterfactual scenario as it does historically. This result
echoes those shown previously in Tables 2 and 3, which attribute virtually all of the observed
m o v e m e n t si no u t p u tt oac o m b i n a t i o no fp r e f e r e nce, technology, and monetary policy shocks
in the short run and to technology shocks alone in the long run. Inﬂation, of course, be-
comes much more stable under the counterfactual scenario. In particular, estimates from
the exogenous target model indicate that without changes in the inﬂation target, U.S. inﬂa-
tion would have peaked at only 4.56 percent in 1975:1, while estimates from the endogenous
target model imply that inﬂation would have hit a postwar high of just 3.92 percent, also in
1975:1. And, through the Fisher eﬀect, the nominal interest rate follows the inﬂation rate
by becoming lower and more stable under the counterfactual scenario.
4 Conclusions, Interpretations, Directions for Future
Work
The estimates of the Federal Reserve’s inﬂation target shown in Figures 4 and 5, together
with the counterfactual histories traced out in Figures 6 and 7, bring the analysis full circle,
back to Friedman’s (1968) “always and everywhere” quote shown at the outset. These
ﬁgures, derived from an estimated New Keynesian model, suggest that the Federal Reserve’s
inﬂation target rose from about 1 1/4 percent in 1959 to hit twin peaks at or above 8 percent
in 1974 and 1980 before falling back below 2 1/2 percent by the end of the sample period
in 2004. These ﬁgures also suggest that absent those target changes, U.S. inﬂation would
never have exceeded 4 or 4 1/2 percent. Thus, by attributing the bulk of inﬂation’s rise and
fall to Federal Reserve policy, the results conﬁrm that to a large extent indeed, postwar U.S.
inﬂation is a “monetary phenomenon.”
What’s more, estimates from the best-ﬁtting, “endogenous target” version of the model
provide some support for stories told previously by Blinder (1982), Hetzel (1998), and Mayer
(1998), which attribute the rise in U.S. inﬂation during the 1960s and 1970s to a systematic
23tendency for Federal Reserve policy to translate short-run price pressures set oﬀ by adverse
supply-side shocks–particularly cost-push shocks–into more persistent movements in the
inﬂation rate itself. And, symmetrically, those same estimates conﬁrm Bomﬁm and Rude-
busch (2000) and Orphanides and Wilcox’s (2002) suggestion that, since 1980, the Federal
Reserve has acted “opportunistically” to bring inﬂa t i o nb a c kd o w ni nt h ea f t e r m a t ho fm o r e
favorable supply-side disturbances. But while the results bring together these two sets of
stories to provide a uniﬁed explanation of inﬂation’s long-run rise and fall, they also indicate
that considerable uncertainty remains about the true source of movements in the Federal
Reserve’s inﬂation target: the best-ﬁtting version of the model, which interprets those move-
ments as part of a deliberate policy response to exogenous supply-side shocks hitting the
economy, turns out to be statistically indistinguishable from the alternative, “exogenous
target” variant that depicts movements in the inﬂation target as purely random.
Stepping back from these literal interpretations of the two model variants and looking
more broadly at the results, some links to other recent contributions to the literature on
postwar U.S. monetary history begin to appear. The results from the endogenous target
model, for instance, also provide some support for Ireland (1999) and Chappell and Mc-
Gregor’s (2004) interpretation of the data, according to which Kydland and Prescott (1977)
and Barro and Gordon’s (1983) time-consistency problem accounts for the Federal Reserve’s
unwillingness to prevent inﬂation from rising in the face of adverse supply-side shocks as well
as its ability to bring inﬂation back down following more favorable supply-side disturbances.
Alternatively, to the extent that the adverse supply shocks that hit the U.S. economy during
the 1970s can be blamed for inaccuracies in oﬃcial estimates of the output gap, the results
obtained here can be squared with Orphanides’ (2002) account of how mismeasurement of
the output gap led Federal Reserve oﬃcials to mistakenly adopt an overly accommodative
monetary policy throughout that decade, fueling the coincident rise in inﬂation. Finally,
the results from the exogenous target model might be reinterpreted in line with Sargent’s
(1999) hypothesis that Federal Reserve oﬃcials actively pushed inﬂation higher during the
241960s and 1970s in a futile eﬀort to exploit a misperceived Phillips curve trade-oﬀ. Clearly,
further extensions to and reﬁnements of the empirical New Keynesian model developed here
a r ec a l l e df o r ,i na ne ﬀort to discriminate more sharply between these competing views of the
data, to understand more fully the policy mistakes of the past, and to guard more reliably
against similar mistakes in the future.
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29Table 1. Maximum Likelihood Estimates and Standard Errors
Unconstrained Model Constrained Model
with Endogenous Target with Exogenous Target
Parameter Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error
γ 0.2553 0.0724 0.2433 0.0682
α 0.0000 ∗ 0.0000 ∗
ρπ 0.9069 0.1605 0.8594 0.1428
ρgy 0.2347 0.0399 0.2617 0.0416
ρa 0.9105 0.0344 0.9097 0.0334
ρe 0.0060 0.2661 0.1310 0.2388
ρv 0.0546 0.0824 0.0711 0.0830
σa 0.0281 0.0084 0.0279 0.0084
σe 0.0007 0.0003 0.0015 0.0003
σz 0.0134 0.0013 0.0128 0.0013
σv 0.0027 0.0003 0.0028 0.0003
σπ 0.0000 ∗ 0.0010 0.0002
δe 0.0010 0.0002 0.0000 ∗∗
δz 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000 ∗∗
L∗ =2 3 1 0 .6812 L∗ =2 3 0 9 .8728
Notes: ∗ indicates that the estimate lies up against the boundary of the parameter space. ∗∗ indicates that the parameter is
constrained to equal zero. L∗ denotes the maximized value of the log likelihood function.
30Table 2. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions, Constrained Model with
Exogenous Inﬂation Target
Output
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
11 3 .53 .96 6 .71 4 .31 .6
45 .11 .58 7 .75 .10 .6
82 .30 .79 4 .62 .20 .2
12 1.40 .49 6 .71 .30 .1
20 0.80 .29 8 .10 .80 .1
40 0.40 .19 9 .10 .40 .0
Inﬂation
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
18 .21 5 .32 6 .42 2 .22 7 .8
45 .79 .02 3 .01 8 .64 3 .7
84 .46 .91 8 .01 4 .55 6 .2
12 3.75 .71 4 .81 1 .96 3 .8
20 2.94 .21 0 .98 .87 3 .2
40 1.82 .66 .65 .48 3 .7
Interest
Rate
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
15 3 .85 .98 .52 1 .61 0 .3
46 7 .42 .44 .78 .11 7 .4
86 6 .81 .42 .94 .82 4 .1
12 62.71 .12 .23 .83 0 .2
20 53.90 .81 .72 .94 0 .7
40 38.10 .61 .22 .05 8 .1
Note: Entries decompose the forecast error variance at each horizon into percentages due
to each of the model’s ﬁve shocks.
31Table 3. Forecast Error Variance Decompositions, Unconstrained Model with
Endogenous Inﬂation Target
Output
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
11 3 .10 .27 4 .51 2 .20 .0
44 .70 .19 1 .24 .00 .0
82 .10 .09 6 .11 .70 .0
12 1.30 .09 7 .61 .00 .0
20 0.70 .09 8 .70 .60 .0
40 0.40 .09 9 .40 .30 .0
Inﬂation
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
17 .34 7 .52 8 .01 7 .20 .0
45 .35 1 .42 8 .11 5 .10 .0
84 .16 1 .52 2 .91 1 .60 .0
12 3.46 8 .11 9 .19 .40 .0
20 2.67 6 .01 4 .66 .80 .0
40 1.58 4 .79 .74 .10 .0
Interest
Rate
Quarters Monetary Inﬂation
Ahead Preference Cost-Push Technology Policy Target
14 9 .42 0 .65 .82 4 .20 .0
46 4 .62 4 .02 .58 .80 .0
86 4 .02 9 .31 .65 .10 .0
12 59.93 4 .71 .54 .00 .0
20 50.94 4 .61 .63 .00 .0
40 35.36 0 .91 .82 .00 .0
Note: Entries decompose the forecast error variance at each horizon into percentages due
to each of the model’s ﬁve shocks.
32Figure 1. Inflation, United States. Measured by annualized, quarter-to-quarter percentage
changes in the GDP implicit price deflator.
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33Figure 2. Impulse responses from the constrained/exogenous target model. Each panel shows the percentage-point response of one of the
model's variables to a one standard deviation shock. The inflation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms.
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34Figure 3. Impulse responses from the unconstrained/endogenous target model. Each panel shows the percentage-point response of one of the
model's variables to a one standard deviation shock. The inflation and interest rates are expressed in annualized terms.
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35Figure 4. Actual inflation (thin black line) and the Federal Reserve's target (thick red line),
as implied by the constrained/exogenous target model.
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
J
a
n
-
5
9
J
a
n
-
6
2
J
a
n
-
6
5
J
a
n
-
6
8
J
a
n
-
7
1
J
a
n
-
7
4
J
a
n
-
7
7
J
a
n
-
8
0
J
a
n
-
8
3
J
a
n
-
8
6
J
a
n
-
8
9
J
a
n
-
9
2
J
a
n
-
9
5
J
a
n
-
9
8
J
a
n
-
0
1
J
a
n
-
0
4
36Figure 5. Actual inflation (thin black line) and the Federal Reserve's target (thick red line),
as implied by the unconstrained/endogenous target model.
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37Figure 6. Actual US data (thin black lines) and counterfactual paths (thick red lines) generated under a constant inflation target
using the constrained/exogenous target model.
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38Figure 7. Actual US data (thin black lines) and counterfactual paths (thick red lines) generated under a constant inflation target
using the unconstrained/endogenous target model.
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